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Summary 
This is a thesis about technology and to a lesser extent, science. To be more 
precise, it is about how a technological society (Norway) tries to protect itself 
from risk born from the same technology that is sustaining it. The thesis is 
more specifically about how a governmental appointed commission made a 
risk assessment on behalf of the Norwegian society in the year 2000. The 
commission was commonly referred to as the “Vulnerability Commission”, 
since one of it’s main findings was that modern society is becoming 
increasingly more vulnerable. This thesis analyses the commissions use of the 
“technical” risk concept, where risk is defined as a function of the probability 
of possible unwanted events and the consequences of these.  
  The central theme in this thesis is that “how” risk is defined, is something 
that greatly influences how a risk assessment is, and can be done. By choosing 
to define risk in this manner, the commission have a priori reduced or 
excluded some aspects of risk from the assessment. The main part of this 
thesis is therefore about how the choice of a specific risk definition to some 
extent “directed” the answers the commission gave in response to it’s 
mandate. 
 
 
 
Keywords: 
Risk, Assessment, Society, Vulnerability 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 The “Vulnerability commission” 
 
On the fourth of July 2000, a governmental commission in Norway, popularly 
referred to as the “Vulnerability commission” released its report: 
 
NOU 2000:24 “A Vulnerable society - Challenges to the public security, 
safety and emergency planning sector” 
 
The main mandate for the commission was “to give a complete description of the risk 
of extraordinary strain on society in peace, during crisis, or war”. The commission 
should also make recommendations on how to reduce risk and vulnerability. The 
commission's report is therefore founded on two premises. The first is that risk may to 
a certain extent be predicted and identified by risk assessment analysis. The second 
premise is that when risk has been identified, it may be prevented by technical or 
organisational changes and/or measures. In the report risk is defined as: 
 
 ”..a function of the probability of possible unwanted events and the 
consequences of these” (p.21). 
 
This is commonly referred to as the “technical” concept of risk. However, this 
technical concept of risk has been challenged by proponents of cultural and social 
theory. Social scientists in the field of science studies have used words like 
“misleading”, “inadequate” or “overconfident” to describe what they perceive as the 
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failings of the technical concept (Krimsky & Golding,1992, p.93, 155 and 231). 
 Both the critique and the report have in common the notion that risk 
assessments and risk concepts must and does have a purpose. A risk concept can 
therefore only be labelled “inadequate” if there exists some purpose, which it can be 
inadequate for. Thus; 
 
in this thesis I will try to find out whether the “technical “ concept of 
risk, as presented in the report, was adequate for fulfilling the 
requirements of the commissions mandate, or if other concepts of 
risk could have replaced or complemented the “technical” approach 
in this specific instance. 
  
In chapter two on Method, I will describe in more detail how I intend to do this, and 
how I have limited my discussion of alternative risk concepts to ensure that my 
discussion stays inside the confinement of a ESST master thesis. 
 The report was chosen as a case for my thesis for two reasons. The first and 
most important reason is that by analysing how risk assessments are done, we may 
better understand both the usefulness and shortcomings of the different approaches to 
risk. This might enable us to design methods for risk assessments that suit our 
purposes better than the methods current in use, or more modestly, complements 
them. The other reason for choosing this particular report as an object for my thesis, is 
that it was the basis for a major reorganization of the civil emergency planning sector 
in Norway and because it still is frequently referred to when discussing security and 
safety in Norway1. 
                                                 
1A typical example of the latter could be found in the newspaper Aftenposten on the 19th of June 2004 
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1.2 Risk, ESST, Science and Technology Studies 
This thesis is written under The European Inter-University Association on Society, 
Science and Technology (ESST) umbrella. 
 The ESST “is an association of universities... and part of a relatively new 
research tradition which focuses on the interrelationships between social, scientific 
and technological processes. The basic characteristic of this tradition is an insistence 
on the necessity to think about social and economic circumstances in order to 
understand the evolution of science and technology...“ (ESST homepage; 
www.esst.uio.no). 
 This is a thesis about technology and to a lesser extent, science. To be more 
precise, it is about how a technological society (Norway) tries to protect itself from 
risk born from the same technology that is sustaining it. 
 Even though technology is seen as greatly improving the way we live and 
organize our society, it also makes society more dependent of it, and therefore more 
vulnerable to disturbances. As I will show later, an overwhelming majority of the 
risks analysed in the report are connected to technology. The risk may be the 
possibility of some vital service being withdrawn due to technological failures. Or it 
may be accidents caused by technology. It may be terrorists using technology to 
multiply their strength. Or it may be the more traditional risk of natural disasters, but 
now with increased consequences because of the technological society we live in. 
 Risk is a very broad concept. In some ways it is just an expression of the fact 
that the future always is uncertain. This fact does not discourage humans from 
attempting to predict and control the future: Economists try to secure the investments 
                                                                                                                                            
in an article called “The protected Childhood”, where the journalist has a reference to the report. 
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of their clients. Engineers try to predict risk and the future safety of their products. 
The “product” may be anything from a single bridge to a chemical factory or a whole 
new technology. Psychologists examine risk from another perspective and are 
interested in why individuals perceive risk differently and explain this due to 
personality traits within humans. Anthropologists and sociologists on the other hand, 
try to explain differences in risk behaviour, using cultural and social factors as basis 
for their discussion. Risk is thus a multi-disciplinary topic. Though, it is not in some 
ways the same “risk” that is being studied by all. 
 
 
1.3 New Technologies and New Risks 
A central theme for many in the field of STS is the fact that new technology creates 
both new possibilities and new difficulties. One problem is related to our increasing 
dependency on technology. This is one of the main concerns of the Vulnerability 
commission, and will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. However, 
I have chosen to include an example in the following section to illustrate how it is not 
the new technology per se that introduces new risks. Instead it is the changes to the 
social organisation of society that cause the risk. These changes are facilitated by new 
technology and its interdependency on other technologies.  
 In the last decade advances in IT-technology have made it possible for a great 
number of elderly people in Norway to stay longer at home before being transferred to 
a nursing home. Regular visits from the health or social services is supplemented by a 
“Feel Safe” alarm which people carry on them 24 hours a day, usually in a chain or in 
their pockets. If something happens, they press a button and hereby activate two-way 
communication with an alarm centre that will dispatch emergency personnel. In this 
way, people who previously were deemed too frail to continue living alone can now 
 9
possibly enjoy some extra years in their own home. The local communes also save 
money, since less capacity is needed in nursery homes. However, in June 2002, a 
chain of failures in the power grid system left a large part of Southwest Norway 
without electricity. This made the “Feel Safe” alarms useless and attempts to send out 
extra personnel to check on all the users ran into difficulties. “Blackouts” in the 
mobile phone network, cars running out of petrol and being unable to refill because 
the petrol stations depended on electrical pumps, and traffic jams due to drop out of 
light, ventilation and control systems in the regions numerous tunnels, were among 
the problems accounted. When the electricity returned after five hours, the affected 
communes had begun to describe the situation as critical, however no casualties were 
reported. This event was as such a prime example on how a perceived positive 
reorganizing of society introduced new and unforeseen risks. Risks that where caused 
by the same technology that made the reorganizing possible in the first place. 
 Another concern related to new (and not so new) technology, raised by many 
social scientist in the seventies and onwards, was what they perceived as a new trend 
in risk related to technology. Their observation was that the distribution of risk is 
becoming skewed and those who now bear the risk, are no longer the same as those 
who reap the benefits of the technology causing the risk. Ulrich Becks Risk Society 
(1986) was an influential example of this view. I do however not intend to suggest 
that there was a black and white division between “technocrats” one side and “social 
scientists” on the other side of these issues, since both of these groups are as 
politically and culturally heterogeneous as most other really large groups of people.  
 A necessity when discussing risk inherent in new technology is the need to 
predict the future impact of this technology. This is difficult and time after time 
history has shown that new technology has been used in ways no one imagined, with 
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consequent unimaginable risks. But social scientists also began to study the changes 
made by implementing new technology. Their claim was that technology is more than 
the “hardware” and that in fact the “hardware” is the lesser part of a new technology: 
 We have already begun to notice another view of technological development, 
one that transcends the empirical and moral shortcomings of cause-and-effect 
models. It begins with the recognition that as technologies are being built and put to 
use, significant alterations in patterns of human activity and human institutions are 
already taking place. New worlds are being made. There is nothing “secondary” 
about this phenomenon. It is, in fact, the most important accomplishment of any new 
technology” (Winner, 1986,p.11). 
 This view is closely connected to the concept of “vulnerability” that the 
commission is concerned about. This will, as already mentioned, be elaborated on in 
the main chapters of this thesis. I also note that Winner is using the word “moral” in 
his text and this is one reason why I chose to include just these sentences. Winner's 
words may serve as an example of the concern many of the writers in the STS field 
have for the social consequences of new technology. The “unequal distribution” of 
risk may serve as an example of one such consequence. This again strikes to the core 
of the critique of the “technical” concept of risk, which is how risk concepts and risk 
perspectives should be used. This will be the main theme of this thesis. 
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2. Method 
 
2.1 Choosing a Theoretical Approach 
As mentioned in the introduction, I have chosen to use a report as the object of study 
of my thesis. The thesis may in this sense be labelled as a case study. My main 
interest is in the final product, the report itself, but then only as a basis for my 
discussion about the merits of the “technical” concept or concepts of risk. I could 
have chosen to do a purely theoretical discussion of the “technical” concept. Instead, I 
have chosen to build this thesis around the fact that to evaluate the usefulness of a 
risk-concept, it must have some use it can be measured against. The report from the 
“Vulnerability commission” was made for a purpose, and therefore the concepts used 
in the report should mirror these purposes. It should therefore be possible to evaluate 
these concepts and decide if they served the purpose(s) the commission intended. I 
will analyse and discuss how the concept(s) of risk chosen by the commission have 
influenced and “directed” the way the risk assessments have been made. 
 So far, I have presupposed that the commission in the report does in fact have a 
“technical” approach to risk. I have also presupposed that this concept falls inside the 
definitions used by the critics of the “technical” approach. One of the first tasks in this 
thesis will therefore be to legitimate that the concepts in the report and those used by 
the critics do overlap. Further, I will have to establish that the supposed purpose of the 
report is such that the critic’s alternative concepts of risk are actually competing in the 
same arena as the concepts in the report. To assist my discussion, I will to some extent 
try to establish whether the report fulfilled the requirements of the mandate or not. 
This will necessarily be in large part a subjective assessment, since the mandate is 
quite broad and in many instances quite imprecise in its demands. Finally, and this 
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will make up the main part of the thesis, all this will then be discussed with the aim of 
answering the question whether the risk concept(s) used in the report could have been 
supplement or replaced. 
 One way, and some may argue the only way, to find real proof or disproof of 
the effectiveness of the methods used in the report, is to “measure” if risk actually has 
been reduced in the Norwegian society since the release of the report. This approach 
faces a number of practical difficulties. First, one must have a way to measure risk, 
which brings us back to one of the main themes of this report, how to define and 
measure risk. One may choose to look at numbers like average life span or accidents 
rates. This may give acceptable results for risk with a high probability like traffic 
accidents. A reduction of the annual rate in Norway from approximately 3502 killed, 
down to 250 after a risk reducing procedure have been implemented, may be seen as 
significant “proof” that the procedure is working. But if the risk is a low probability 
risk, there may be no visible reduction. 
 Terrorism is an example of this. There have been no3 major acts of terrorism in 
Norway the last twenty years. The commission has still recommended several 
measures to reduce the threat of terrorism. How long a period should we endure 
without terrorism, before one could conclude that the risk of terrorism has been 
reduced? These are problems that will also be brought up again later, when discussing 
the different concepts of risk. But to continue on the practical level; even if one agrees 
that risk has been reduced, there is still left the difficulty of proving the casual 
connection between the report, the measures proposed in the report, the actual 
measures implemented and finally the “fact” that risk is actually reduced or at least is 
                                                 
2Source: Norwegian Bureau of Statistics at www.ssb.no 
3There have been several incidents in Norway the last 20 years that straddle the border between 
terrorism and political violence, but no one on the scale seen in Northern Ireland, Spain or the 
United States. (E-mail discussion with research fellow Tore Bjørgo at NUPI) 
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perceived to be reduced. In short, there is a problem of measurement. 
 I will not go further with this discussion, since it is meant only to illustrate one 
of the major reasons why I, in this thesis, have chosen a more theoretical approach. I 
will analyse the report and attempt to extract from it the concepts and perspectives of 
risk that are visible, and hopefully those that are unspoken and taken for granted by 
the commission, intentionally or not. 
 
 
 2.2 Choosing Concepts and Perspectives on Risk 
A “concept” is, according to dictionaries, just a set of ideas related to one theme or 
subject. I find this to be a quite “accurate” description of what a concept of risk is. A 
“perspective”, should as the word indicates, in addition tell something about where 
you stand and what you consequently will observe. There seems, however, to be no 
common standard for when to use “concept” and when to use “perspective” and in 
some of the papers and articles that I will treat later in my discussion, the authors 
sometimes shift between using these, and other words, when discussing risk. 
 I will not try, and will not be able to in this context to give a complete overview 
of all theories of risk. I will instead use literature, which I found relevant when 
discussing the report and the commission’s use of the “technical” concept of risk. I 
will of course try to include literature that seems to be especially popular or dominant 
when other authors discuss the “technical” concept. This may leave me open for 
criticism that “this” author and “that” theory should have been included. 
 I will repeat that it is the report and the concept(s) of risk used in the report that 
are the subjects of this thesis. I have chosen to compare the “technical” concept to 
other concepts of risk as a mean to find flaws in the “technical” concept only. The 
alternative or competing concepts are therefore not supposed to be the subject of this 
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thesis, but they will of course be discussed and analysed themselves. I have not done 
any comparative studies to determine if the report is a typical or a special kind of risk 
assessment. Therefore, if I find that alternative theory “A” is not a viable alternative 
to the “technical” concept in this particular case, I can for an example not generalize 
and claim that theory “A” is not viable in any case. 
 Risk, as treated in this thesis, may be linked to the field of Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) both directly and indirectly. Directly through the way 
questions and themes are constructed. The indirect link is that many of the social 
theories of risk that will be treated in this thesis, are made by writers who refer to, and 
lend support from authors central to field of STS. When discussing the relationship 
between science, technology, society and knowledge, these authors often include 
references to writers such as Bruno Latour, Wiebe Bijker, Barry Barnes, David Bloor 
and Thomas Kuhn among others. All of who can be said to belong to the “core” of 
early science and technology studies and which are almost compulsory when 
discussing “knowledge” and how “experts” make assessments on technological 
issues. 
 The discussion of the report from the “Vulnerability commission”, - 
NOU2000:24 “A Vulnerable society - Challenges to the public security, safety and 
emergency planning sector in Norway” will be the main part of my thesis. I will try to 
keep in mind that my source is the report, and will hopefully resist the temptation to 
infer too much about the methods of the commission in it self. Especially since the 
commission was a politically appointed committee that in turn depended on the work 
of several sub-committees and work groups within different ministries and other 
public organisations, of which I have very little insight. 
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2.3 About my Employer 
I must also mention that I am currently an employee of the Directorate for Civil 
Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB). Even if this probably has made me 
presumptuous about the theme “risk”, I believe that I have made my discussion 
transparent enough, so that any unintended consequence of this is visible. I will also 
emphasis that this thesis is written by me in the role of a student. 
 
Writing a thesis like this is also a process of discovery and one can never be confident 
that the hypothesises ant thoughts that inhabits ones mind before the writing starts, 
will survive until the end. Even if the material in question was quite well know, one 
will during the writing process read it with fresh eyes, compare it to new ideas in 
previously unread books and hopefully in the end make it all come together. 
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3. The Report NOU2000:24  
 
3.1. Political and Historical Context 
Former Prime Minister Kåre Willoch from the Conservative Party was appointed as 
chairman. Thirteen4 other members represented a broad field of political and 
professional interest. In addition to the expected representatives from the military and 
security services, the commission included politicians and the leader of an 
environmental NGO among others. 
 Based primarily on this report, the Government proposed and the Parliament 
accepted, several changes to the civil protection and emergency-planning sector in 
Norway. One of the major changes was the establishment of the new Directorate for 
Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB) by the merger of the Directorate for 
Civil Defence and Emergency Planning and the Directorate for Fire and Electrical 
Safety (DBE). Another outcome was that the Defence Security Service was 
reorganised into an independent National Security Authority (NSM). 
 The “Vulnerability commission” may be seen as a response to the end of the 
Cold War and its influence on Norwegian security and safety policies. To explain this, 
its necessary to look back to April 9th 1940 and the concept of “total defence”. On 
April the 9th 1940, Nazi Germany invaded and occupied then ill prepared Norway. 
The occupation ended when Germany surrendered on the 8th of may 1945. After the 
                                                 
4Politicians: Bjørnar Olsen, vice chairman, Labour party (Ap), also information director at Statkraft. 
Egil Jørgen Eikanger, admiral, Conservative party (H), also former director of military intelligence 
(FO/E). Kåre Harila, Christian Democratic party (KrF), former state secretary in the Ministry of 
transport and communications. Solveig Blækan, Centre Party (Sp). Karen Margrethe Mjelde, 
Progress Party (Frp). Lisbet Rugtvedt, Socialist Left Party (SV). Torild Skogsholm, Liberal Party 
(V), director of NetCom . 
Professionals: Helen Bøsterud, director of the Directorate for civil defence and emergency planning 
(DSB). Per Sefland, director of the Police Security Service (PST). Jan Erik Larsen, brigadier, 
director military security service (FO/S). Hilde Caroline Sundrehagen, director general, Ministry of 
Health and Social affairs. Fredric Hauge, director of the environmental NGO, “Bellona”. Jan 
Hovden, professor at Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU). 
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war the phrase “never again 9th of April” became the central thesis to Norwegian 
security politics. The concept of “total defence” was introduced to describe how 
Norway would prepare (and hopefully through deterrence) avoid another war. “Total 
defence” would make sure that all the resources of civil society were made available 
to the military in case of war. Complex plans were drawn up to facilitate this and 
several offices (later merged into the DSB) were given the responsibility to make the 
necessary arrangements. 
 However with the end of the Cold War, the Norwegian defence went through a 
period of downsizing. This lead to a decrease in the need for massive support from the 
civil society in case of war. The probability of war on Norwegian soil lessened 
proportionately with the increasing likelihood of Norwegian forces being engaged in 
combat abroad. This, together with an increasing focus on “peacetime” risk, brought 
risk prevention more on to the stage in Norwegian security political debate. The 
Chernobyl accident in 1986, a hurricane that hit the western coast of Norway in 1992 
and a large flood in 1995 where all events that highlighted the need for a more 
coordinated response to non-military risks in Norway. The time was therefore ripe for 
the “Vulnerability commission” to be appointed in 1999. As mentioned, the 
commission may be seen as a response to the end of the cold war. But the report was 
only one part of the governmental attempt to modernize the Norwegian safety, 
security and military sector. 
 
 
3.2 The Relationship to Other Important Documents 
When the report had been presented to the government, it was used as the basis for the 
government's proposal to parliament (Stortinget), together with other documents. 
These included: “NOU2001:31 “When accidents happen”, which concerned the 
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Norwegian Rescue services. “St.pr.nr 45 (2000-2001) The restructuring of the 
Norwegian defence forces” which as the name suggests concerns how the defence 
forces should be organized after the end of the “Cold War”. “St.mld.nr 25 (1997-
1998) Main guidelines for civil protection” which concerned the civil defence forces. 
 The proposal, “St.mld.nr 17 (2001-2002) The road to a less vulnerable society”, 
brought forward most of the recommendations from the commission. One noteworthy 
exception was that the government did not want a separate ministry for safety and 
security as the commission had proposed. Most of the government's proposals were 
accepted by parliament, as documented in “Innst.S.nr 9 (2002-2003) The road to a 
less vulnerable society”. This then led to a further proposal from the government, the 
“St.mld.nr 17 (2002-2003) Reorganizing Norway’s directorates” which was mainly 
concerned with practical and administrative issues related to the reorganizing of the 
DSB and other directorates. 
 
 
3.3 Mandate 
In order to discuss the report, it is necessary to analyse the mandate of the commission 
in some detail. The mandate not only outlines what the commission should do, but 
also puts forth guidelines on how they should conduct their work. I have therefore 
included a complete translation of the mandate given to the commission. The more 
important implications of the mandate will then be discussed in the following 
chapters. 
 
The mandate (p.20)5
1.The commission shall examine the vulnerability of society with the aim of 
                                                 
5The numbering is by the author and not present in the original text. 
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increasing its safety, security and preparedness. 
2.The commission shall incorporate lessons learned from national and international 
experiences related to safety and security. 
3.The commission shall give a complete description of the risk of extraordinary strain 
on the society in peace, during crisis or war.  
a.this includes assessing the increasing vulnerability of critical supplies and 
services, and the risk of disruptions due to human error, technological 
breakdown, natural disasters, terror, sabotage or war. 
b.this also includes assessing risk, vulnerability and preparedness in the 
civilian sector in case of epidemics, accidents or deliberate use of nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons or material. 
c.a common risk assessment shall form the basis for recommending and 
ranking appropriate actions. 
4.The commission shall analyse the vulnerability situation and give a principal 
evaluation of the strength and weaknesses inherent in the current preparedness 
systems. 
a.based on this analysis, the commission shall recommend general and 
principal actions in order to ensure an acceptable level of security and 
safety for the civilian population and critical services during peace, crisis 
and war. 
b.the commission shall in this context also assess the structure and 
organization of the vulnerability reducing enterprise. 
5.A major approach will be the future organization of, and mission for, the civilian 
preparedness sector. 
a.the commission shall make a principal judgement on how, or if, the 
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preparedness sector should be changed as a result of major national and 
international developments. 
6.The commission shall evaluate actions that may contribute to strengthening the 
public involvement, increase voluntarily contribution and ensure a stronger focus 
on preparedness among private companies and in the Norwegian communes. 
7.The commission shall encourage public awareness, knowledge and debate 
concerning risk and vulnerability. Safety and security must be weighted against the 
need for an open society. 
8.The commission shall establish contact, and cooperate with the governmental 
commission on defence policy. 
9.The commission shall deliver its report, with guidelines for the process of reducing 
vulnerability, no later than the 1st of July 2000. 
10.The commission shall, if necessary, recommend further fields of investigation. 
11.The commission shall give an account of administrative and economical 
consequences of its proposals. 
 
 
3.4 Concerning the Norwegian Word “Samfunnssikkerhet” 
The Norwegian word “samfunnsikkerhet” is frequently used when one wishes to 
include every aspect of the public drive to ensure a safe and secure society and it is 
used throughout the report from the “Vulnerability commission”. It may be translated 
as “the safety and security of society” .The Norwegian language does not have 
separate words for “safety” and “security”. Instead the word “sikkerhet” is used for 
both and it is the context that decides which meaning is implied. 
 The frequent use of the word “samfunnssikkerhet” in the report, clearly implies 
that it is “the society” that is the subject and not the individuals constituting the 
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public. One may infer from the report that the commission did not wish to include the 
“environment” as a part of “society”. This is also specifically mentioned in the 
introduction to the report. 
 
 
3.5 The Risk in the Report – a Summary 
I have found it necessary to include a short summary of the risks presented in the 
report. I have organized these summaries in accordance with the “technical” concept 
of risk even if the commission did not organize its risk description in the same way. I 
have chosen this order of presentation in order to make it easier to spot overall trends, 
draw conclusions and follow the discussion presented in the next chapter. One of my 
aims is to introduce to the reader to report and give enough information so that my 
own conclusions in the end of this thesis seem well funded. 
 
The report: Chapter 4 - Increasing vulnerability (p.35) 
In this chapter, the commission introduces what I have identified as one of its main 
theses, the assumption that the vulnerability of society is increasing. This is attributed 
to several factors: 
• Internationalisation and globalisation reduces Norwegian control and influence 
in the business sector. 
• The increasing use of computers and telecommunication in both the private and 
public sector have increased efficiency, but have also made these sectors very 
vulnerable to a technological breakdown, since the “old” paper based and 
“manual” ways of working have been dismantled an can no longer act as back-
up in case of emergency. 
 22
• The commission also mentions the recent trend towards privatisation of public 
services. Although the commission mostly appreciates this as a positive 
development, it is also concerned that this makes public control and regulation 
more difficult. 
 
Chapter 5 consists only of a short discussion on the formalities regarding cooperation 
between the police and military forces. 
 
The report: Chapter 6 - Telecommunications and electrical energy (p.55) 
Description of risk event: In this chapter telecommunications and electrical energy is 
given status as a “pillar of modern society” by the commission. The “risk” identified 
is that this “pillar” or “service” may be withdrawn. 
Probability of risk: Medium to high 
Consequences of risk: For the public the consequences would become severe, and 
during winter even life threatening in short time. The industry and finance sector 
would fast incur huge economical losses, and the government’s ability to function 
(controlling the society) would be impaired. 
Cause of risk: War, terrorism, human or technological failure are cited as the main 
cause. Deregulation and the ensuing proliferation of commercial actors have greatly 
increased the difficulties for the government in regulating and enforcing efforts to 
reduce vulnerability. 
 The commission suggests that physical protection of the energy- and 
telecommunications networks, and greater effort to build in redundancy will reduce 
the risk. In this chapter the commission also defines what it perceives as one of the 
purposes of government: ”.. it is the responsibility of the State (Government) to 
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ensure the insight and determination needed to achieve a robust infrastructure, To 
facilitate this, it is absolutely necessary to acquire sound knowledge about the 
technological evolution, so that vulnerability may be reduced through political 
actions and directives..”(p.55) 
 
The report: Chapter 7- Transport safety (p.75) 
Description of risk event: The risks discussed in this chapter are first of all accidents 
with public transport, and secondly, accidents with dangerous goods such as gas, 
petrol or poisonous chemicals. Both accidents on land, at sea and in the air are 
discussed. 
Probability of risk: High to medium. 
Consequences of risk: Death or injury to people is the main concern, but there is also 
some focus on “denial of service” events. Such as war or terrorism obstructing 
transport of critical goods. These last events would mainly have economic 
consequences. 
Cause of risk: “Accidents” and terrorism are the main causes, but the commission also 
discusses the technical standard of the transportation system and how this may 
influence the probability of accidents. 
 The commission recommends increased focus on how the regulatory bodies are 
organised. This would facilitate a more coherent approach to transportation safety.  
 In chapter seven the commission also introduces, in a discussion regarding 
tunnel safety, the possibility that it is the public perception of risk that is the problem. 
The commission does also mention two developments that are causes for concern. 
The first one is the demand for more “effective” transport services. This leads to short 
safety margins and less time (and money) for maintaining and executing safety checks 
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on planes, trains and automobiles. When the “market” decides, it is often too costly to 
build in redundancy in a system if this is not made obligatory by the authorities for all 
participants. 
 The other concern is the often-exaggerated “belief” in new technology and the 
possibility for exposing risk in advance using, among other methods, fault three 
analyses. This is a concern echoed by several of the authors belonging to the “cultural 
studies” school of risk research. The commission does also find that organizations and 
people frequently underestimate risk that may arise when introducing new 
technology, especially problems that may arise because of the need for interplay 
between people and new technology. 
 
The report: Chapter 8 - Supply contingency planning (p.88) 
Description of risk event: In this chapter the commission is mostly concerned with the 
needs of the defence forces and the civilian population in times of crisis or war. The 
risk “event” is thus described as lack of critical supplies like food, oil and medicines. 
Probability of risk: For Norway as whole the risk is regarded as very low, but it is not 
unlikely that some parts of Northern Norway may experience short disruptions in 
these supplies due to heavy winter storms. 
Consequences of risk: Ultimately starvation may be a problem, but probably the most 
serious consequence may be shortage of medical supplies. 
Cause of risk: War or bad weather may be the direct cause for supply crisis’s, but the 
commission find the real problem to be organizational changes in the last decade. 
Centralized warehouses, the “just in time” principle, and increased reliance on import 
from low wage countries instead of local production are some of the factors that 
increases vulnerability. Medicine and health-products are especially mentioned. 
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 The solutions suggested by the commission include establishing central stores 
of critical products and regional stores of basic food and fuel. 
 
The report: Chapter 9 - The Oil and Gas sector (p.94) 
Description of risk event: Norway is one of the world’s largest6 oil and gas exporting 
countries and the economy’s reliance on this cannot be underestimated. The chapter 
discusses three risks: large accidents7, oil spills and the economic impact of 
disruptions in the oil production. These risks may be seen to overlap, since accidents 
may cause both oil spills and disruptions and so forth. But the report is most 
concerned with deliberate disruptions to production, either by terrorism or 
international conflict. 
Probability of risk: The commission describes it as low, but it may also be on the 
increase and the commission underlines the uncertainty involved when trying to 
predict terrorism activities. 
Consequences of risk: Apart from the direct risk to the workers onboard the oilrigs, 
the commission’s main concern is the financial consequences for the Norwegian 
economy. There is also some focus on the environmental consequences of an oil spill. 
Cause of risk: the commission again mentions Accidents, technical breakdowns and 
terrorism as the most likely direct causes for the events discussed. However, 
Norway’s international political and military engagements may increase the risk of 
terrorism. The increasing pressure on profit margins may cause oil companies to 
reduce safety margins and investment in redundancy. 
 The commission suggests introducing stronger mandatory requirements for safe 
                                                 
6Norway is the world third largest oil-exporting nation. Source: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nonopec.html 
7Since the beginning of Norwegian oil exploration in the late sixties, there have been several accidents 
in the North Sea. The most disastrous occurred in 1980 when the hotel-platform “Alexander 
Kielland” capsized 123 people were drowned. 
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procedures, redundancy and emergency planning. Increasing co-operation between 
responsible ministries are also recommended together with measures to scan 
employees for suspected criminals and or terrorists, which is not mandatory today. 
 
The report: Chapter 10 - Disease containment (p.106) 
Description of risk event: Outbreak of a contagious and deadly virus born diseases in 
Norway. The risk for society of any given disease is given by its seriousness (death 
rate) multiplied with its contagiousness. 
Probability of risk: Medium 
Consequences of risk: According to the report, a “worst case” disease would be the 
reoccurrence of influenza on the same scale as the “Spanish flu” in the early 20th 
century. A pandemic like this may kill as many as 30.000 people in Norway. 
Cause of risk: Viruses are of course the direct cause of all of the most dangerous 
epidemic diseases. The commission therefore focuses their discussion on global 
trends, like increased international travel, fewer people receiving vaccines, overuse of 
antibiotics and emergence of “new” diseases like Ebola and HIV, as the cause for 
increased risk of epidemics in Norway. In the commissions opinion there is also to 
few hospital wards suitable for treating contagious diseases. 
 The commission therefore recommends strengthening knowledge and co-
operation on the local level.  
 
The report: Chapter 11 - Food Safety (p.115) 
Description of risk event: The report discusses the risk of contamination of food by 
biological, chemical or radioactive substances 
Probability of risk: Low to medium 
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Consequences of risk: This may pose a serious hazard to human health, but may also 
cause lack of public and international trust in the products involved, which may lead 
to economic losses for the producers. 
Cause of risk: Accidental pollution during production or transport or deliberate 
pollution by terrorists or criminals is listed by the commission as major causes for 
concern. The commission doe also recognize that due to centralization and 
globalisation, food is today transported over longer distances, there is an increasing 
risk of food being exposed to contamination. 
 The commission therefore recommends that the different laws regulating food 
safety should be brought together in one law and that there should be established an 
independent body for overseeing food safety. 
 
The report: Chapter 12 - Fresh water supply (p.118) 
Description of risk event: This chapter discusses the vulnerability of the fresh water 
supply in Norway. In the introduction the commission states that this is a vital factor 
in keeping the public healthy. A stable supply is also vital for the food-industry. The 
freshwater system is very decentralized, with almost 2000 water-works ranging from 
those supplying only a handful of houses, to the large public ones supplying a 
hundred thousand households or more. 
Probability of risk: Low to medium 
Consequences of risk: Pollution of the water supply may pose a serious hazard to 
human health; where as disruption of the water supply may cause severe problems for 
both the food industry and the public’s health. 
Cause of risk: The main threats are seen by the commission as being contamination of 
the fresh water supply, either accidentally or deliberately (terrorism is especially 
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mentioned), and technical breakdown in the water works purifying systems and 
distribution network. This may happen because of old and poorly maintained and 
secured distribution networks in many places around the country. 
 The commission therefore recommends stronger focus on contingency planning 
and alternative supply sources. 
 
The report: Chapter 13 - Nuclear threats (p.125) 
Description of risk event: Fallout from nuclear accidents abroad, accident with 
radioactive sources in Norway, radiation from “dirty bombs” or nuclear war. 
Probability of risk: Medium to high 
Consequences of risk: Ranging from local pollution and disturbances to agriculture to 
massive death and destruction in case of nuclear war. The physiological impact and 
experienced risk will be great for all events. 
Cause of risk: In the commission’s résumé of this chapter, human or technological 
failure, terrorism and war are mentioned as the events most likely to lead to nuclear 
fallout on Norwegian soil. 
 The commission recommends increased efforts in the Norwegian trust to 
enhance safety in Russian nuclear reactors, non-proliferation work, and more 
equipment for measuring radiation, as measures likely to reduce the risk from nuclear 
radiation. 
 
The report: Chapter 14 - Chemical and biological weapons (p.140) 
Description of risk event: Deliberate use of chemical or biological agents, or industrial 
accidents involving poisonous chemicals. 
Probability of risk: Low, but may be on the increase. 
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Consequences of risk: May lead to mass casualties if it happens in urban areas. 
Cause of risk: Again, the commission lists war, terrorism or accidents as the most 
likely causes for a risk event. Lack of control with chemical weapons in the former 
soviet bloc and proliferation of knowledge and equipment for producing biological 
agents are factors that may increase the likelihood of such weapons being used by 
terrorists. 
 Educating health personnel in recognizing and treating effect of these weapons 
are one of the commission’s recommendations, together with enlarging stores of 
medicines for treating patients inflicted by chemical or biological weapons. Hospitals 
should also plan for events involving mass casualties. The commission is especially 
concerned by the lack of recognition these threats receive. 
 
The report: Chapter 15 - Mass influx of refugees (p.156) 
Description of risk event: This is a short chapter and is mostly concerned with the 
possibility of massive influx of refugees from Russia to Northern Norway.  
Probability of risk: Very low. 
Consequences of risk: In this chapter the “risk event” does not fit quite into this 
formula and there is no discussion of any consequences for the Norwegian society. 
Cause of risk: War and economic or ecological breakdown in Russia, are mentioned 
by the commission as likely causes of this “risk”. 
 The commission recommends better coordination between the different 
agencies and ministries, which would be involved in case of this event transpiring. 
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4. Analysis of the Report 
This chapter contains the main analysis of the report and the discussion of the relevant 
concepts of risk. The chapter has been divided into three main sections. The first one 
is concerned with the concepts of risk in the report and especially the “technical” 
concept of risk. The next section discusses the purpose of the report and the purpose 
of risk assessments in the general. The third and final part discusses several problems 
related to risk assessment and the use of the “technical” concept of risk, such as the 
problem of predicting risk, the problem of measuring risk, the problem of setting risk 
levels on behalf of the public and at the end the problem of unequal distribution of 
risk.  
 
 
4.1 Risk in the Report - The “Technical” Risk Concept 
As mentioned in the introduction, there exists no final definition of the “technical” 
concepts of risk. This does not however mean that there is no common understanding 
of what approximately should be included. 
 According to Ortwin Renn (Krismky & Golding,1992), there appears to be 
seven approaches to the conception and assessment of risk. Renn identifies these and 
have grouped three of them under the heading of “technical” risk analysis. Renn is 
here using the term “technical” in his analysis of methods for risk assessment, where 
as other writers use the “technical” when discussing definitions of risk. I will return to 
this distinction. Two of the methods mentioned by Renn can be said to be the main 
methods used by the commission in it risk assessments. 
 The first one is “probabilistic risk analysis”, using event and fault tree analysis. 
This may be said to be the most common method when studying a system in order to 
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find out what may go wrong. In most of the chapters of the report the commission 
demonstrates the use of this method in a more or less systematic way. The 
commission examines a part of society, such as the telephone systems and tries to 
discover strengths and weaknesses in order to give an overall estimate of the systems 
robustness, or as the commissions mostly express it, the system’s vulnerability. The 
strength of this method is that in theory at last, it is not dependent on experience and 
can thus be used to analyse new systems and technologies. Its biggest weakness is that 
there is no way of knowing if one has “missed” some important factors in the 
analysis. That is, there is no way of knowing until an accident happens and someone 
says: “Oops, we forgot that”. Another way to look at this is that this method is limited 
by the imagination of those doing the analysis. The report presents the findings of 
several sub-committees and expert groups in a somewhat popularised form. Therefore 
it is sometimes difficult to judge how detailed and thorough the “fault tree analysis” 
has been. 
 The second method mentioned by Renn, is the actuarial approach, most 
commonly found in the insurance business, but also used in other fields of risk 
assessment when there exists historical data that can be used. 
 The actuarial approach may be very useful for insurance companies obviously, 
but also for agencies concerned with central planning. There are examples in the 
report on how accident statistics are used in this way to justify recommending some 
measures for risk reduction instead of others, most notably in chapter seven regarding 
transport safety. One of the main critiques levelled against the use of the actuarial 
approach in risk management, is that it deals with averages. Which may be fine for 
those doing the risk management, but may lead to some people being exposed to 
excessive risk, without this being noticed. In some case it may however be a 
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deliberate choice to use average8 risk exposure as a guideline. But then we are down 
to moral questions. And the answers to these are dependent on social and cultural 
factors. Is it “right” to implement some regulation that reduces risk for many people, 
if drastically increases the risk for a few? The commission does not give any specific 
answers to questions like these. In the mandate the Government ask the commission 
to “recommend general and principal actions in order to ensure an acceptable level 
of security and safety for the civilian population”(p.22). But there is no further 
specification on what constitutes an “acceptable” level of risk. The morality of the use 
of averages in risk assessment will be analysed in more detail when discussing the 
unequal distribution of risk in section 4.3.3. 
 Renn was writing about method, but the commission’s report does also contain 
a definition of risk. Roger E. Kasperson (Krimsky & Golding,1992,p.155) labels the 
definition of “Risk as the function of the probability of an adverse event and the 
magnitude of its consequences “ as the “technical” concept. Steve Rayner (Krimsky & 
Golding,1992,p.93) goes one further and limits it’s adequacy to engineering-type 
calculations, and do not find it suitable for risk management. 
 
 
4.1.1 The Presentation of Risk 
As seen in the previous chapter, the commission discusses risks that in most cases can 
be expressed according to the “technical” concept of risk. The commission describes 
some more or less unwanted event and in most chapters also tries to describe causes 
for these events, their consequences and their probability, although the probability is 
often given only a cursory treatment. In the introduction to chapter four, the 
                                                 
8 This is somewhat one the side of this thesis and the commission’s work. But health authorities 
frequently set safety standards based on average exposure, and tries thus in fact to answer the 
question “How safe is safe enough?” 
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commission outlines two main sources of risk. The first one the commission describes 
as “the well known types, such as natural disaster, accidents and technological 
breakdown”. The other one is “purposely perpetrated violent actions by 
humans...which in most cases are labelled as terrorism”. 
 The commission obviously share the notion that risk is something that can be 
reduced and or eliminated. This may happen by removing the cause of risk. Or it may 
happen by lessening the impact should the risk manifest itself in an actual event. The 
consequence of this event (and thus of the risk) may again be eliminated or reduced, 
either by protecting the subject, or by increasing the built in redundancy in the 
subject. The last option is of course only possible when the subject is a technical 
object or an organisational structure. When the subject is humans or the environment, 
redundancy is moot. There is no backup when you are dead. In other words, lessening 
the impact of a risk may be done by increasing robustness or, as the report frames it 
most of the time, by decreasing vulnerability. 
 So far different risk seems to be included in the report when fulfilling one or 
more of the following three criteria: 
1. Historical events: It has happened before, either in Norway or abroad and the 
risk is implicitly unwanted. However, in many cases there has been no such 
events in recent Norwegian history and the commission has to “import” 
experience from other countries. Terrorism seems to be one of the prime 
examples of this approach. 
2. Vulnerable subject: The subject of the risk is perceived as vulnerable. How 
vulnerability is related to risk and affects both the probability of an event and 
the consequences will be discussed later in this chapter. 
3. Serious consequences: The risk is included because of the serious 
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consequences if it were to happen. The consequences can be divided into two 
types. The first one does indirect “harm/damage” to the society (here 
obviously to be understood as the public), as it concerns the denial of some 
vital services, like water supply, electricity and so on. The other types of 
consequences are those that directly affect the public. Such as terrorist bombs, 
epidemics or large-scale pollution. Some of the risks outlined in the report 
may span both of these two categories. 
 
4.1.2 It May Happen... 
 One necessary part of the concept of risk is the probability of something happening. 
If the probability of an event is 100 percent, then “risk” is no longer an appropriate 
description. Invoking “destiny” or other such concepts violates the concept of risk.9
 In the common sense, risk can be said to be something that is dangerous and 
that may lead to death or injury. Taken to its extreme, there exist no activities that are 
not risky. In other words, everything, even doing what I'm doing now, sitting alone in 
a quiet library, writing, is a risk activity. A plane may crash into the building any 
moment now and this would be the end of my writing. Puh! I did not happen and 
probably was a very unlikely scenario. The point is, that if we define risk in this way, 
the concept of risk looses any explanatory power. If the concept of risk is to be useful, 
we must reserve the notion of risk for those activities and situations that may be said 
to be more dangerous or more “risky” than one would normally accept. 
 I am already here touching into what is a reoccurring theme in this thesis, which 
is the notion that risk is something that “I”, “we” or “someone” defines or choose to 
identify. It is in other words something “I”, “we” etc. construct. But in the same 
                                                 
9The minister responsible for safety represented an example of this worldview after a group of pilgrims 
died when a bridge collapsed in Saudi-Arabia. “It was the will of God”. Reported in the Guardian 
on 2.feb 2004. 
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instance risk may be said to really exist. I will try to illustrate this by using an 
example from Norway and my directorate’s field of responsibility. In the western part 
of our country where fjords with steep mountainsides rising up are abundant, there are 
several places where the geologists say that soon very larges pieces of the 
mountainside will fall into the fjord causing enormous waves that will wash away 
those villages unfortunate to be located in the vicinity. Paul Slovic writes that  
 “Risk does not exist “out there”, independent of our minds and cultures, 
waiting to be measured. Human beings have invented “risk” to help them understand 
and cope with dangers... There is no such thing as...”objective risk.”” (Krimsky & 
Golding,1992,p.117)  
  I am not quite sure if I totally agree with this statement, but it is easy to show 
that the risk discussed in this example also is, also but maybe not only, a construct. 
The rock exists. Without going into a deep philosophical discussion on how 
knowledge is gained, I accept the geologists statement that “the rock will fall down” 
as a fact as well.10 They have based this statement on measuring increasing fractures 
around the Cliffside, experience from earlier similar catastrophes, and data 
simulations of the behaviour of flood waves. To summarize, the rock will fall down, 
and if nothing is done, many people will surely drown. The remaining uncertainty is 
“when”, to which the geologists give the somewhat inaccurate answer “soon”. The 
“construction” of risk in this instance is of course that we have connected several 
statements about rocks, flood waves and wiped out villages into a coherent “risk”. 
And we have done this in order to better manage this risk. On the other hand, the rock 
would still exist and eventually fall down even if the term “geologist” had never been 
invented and nobody had climbed that mountain. 
                                                 
10 This statement is strictly speaking only an opinion, although well funded, and not a “fact”, but for the 
purpose of the discussion of risk in this thesis, I will not elaborate on this.  
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4.1.3 Public or Personal Perception? 
Lets us for a moment leave the “objective/subjective” risk and instead take a brief 
look at how different groups of people relate to this risk, and how it may give us 
insight into the “constructed” risk.11  
 The people living along the fjord have several options when choosing how to 
relate to this risk. They may wish to move to a “safer” place or they may wish 
someone (the authorities) to try to make the rock not fall down. Some may wish for a 
warning system so that they can evacuate their houses when the rock falls, because 
simulations have shown that it would be some time for this if the warning system is 
activated the instant the cliff breaks loose. Or people may choose to ignore the whole 
issue, or at least rank it low on their list of “risks to worry about”. Based on the 
activity of the local population, the latter seems to be the most common reaction. It is 
difficult to decide, without further questioning if people really do not care, or if they 
acknowledge the risk but chose to stay anyway. 
 But the “experts” are gravely concerned. The county governor (Fylkesmann) is 
worried and has put it high on his agenda. He, or to be precise, his office have made 
an risk assessment on behalf of the people concerned and have come to a different 
result than most of the inhabitants in the region. Why? 
 There has been done quite a lot of research on why people perceive risk 
differently, and it will be touched into to some extent later in this chapter and I found 
Paul Slovic’s Risk Perception quite useful on this theme. But the vulnerability 
commission, or the aforementioned Fylkesmann and his “experts” are not making 
personal risk assessment. It is not their individual perception of risk that is asked for. 
They are expected to establish a kind of “public” perception of risk. This perception 
                                                 
11 The following section is based on reading of newspapers and practical experience from work. 
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should be “objective” to some extent if we by objective mean, “free from personal 
belief and prejudice” and it should represent in some way the public expectation on 
how the authorities should perform risk assessments. The geologists are of course 
“experts” and should presumably know, but their role is as advisors to the 
Fylkesmann that make a decision on how serious to rate this risk. I will here resist the 
temptation to introduce theories from the field of political science on how 
bureaucracies will define new areas of responsibility in order to maintain their own 
importance and position in the society. The point I want to make, is that the single 
“objective” risk of the falling rock, has been transformed into several “subjective” 
risks. Dependent on whom you ask; the “public”, the “experts” or the bureaucrats, the 
description of the risk will not be the same. 
 I do also believe that this discussion sometimes is made a bit more complicated 
because people confuse the STS use of “objective”, which I in this instance interpret 
as synonymous with an ”attribute” of nature or reality which exists independent of 
human observation” and the more “common” use of the word “objective” which I 
interpret as “an assessment made free from personal beliefs and prejudice”. 
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4.2 The Purpose of the Report and Risk Assessment 
One may ask why was this report necessary? Or why did the government feel that it 
was? In chapter three I have given some historical reasons for why it was written, 
when it was. But now I wish to give a more basic answer to this question. In order to 
do so, I feel that is necessary to take a detour and start with a question about 
governments. 
 One of the purposes of “government” - here used in its broadest sense, is to 
protect the society from dangers. This statement is of course open to debate and there 
exists quite a few “governments” around the world that don’t’ appear to be 
particularly interested in their citizens health or safety. But since this is not an essay in 
political science, I will only pursue this debate as far as saying that in the 
Scandinavian, social-democratic, “paternalistic” tradition, almost every citizen 
expects the government to take some steps to protect them from harm. This “world 
view” is obviously present in the report, at least as an unspoken premise. 
 The challenge facing the government is that it is impossible to protect society 
from all possible harm. One should always be careful when labelling something as 
“impossible”, but in this instance I believe it is justified. I base this claim on the 
following four premises. First of all, some dangers are unavoidable, at least with our 
present technology or political and social organization. Several forms of cancer or a 
huge asteroid impact may be examples of such dangers. Secondly, our ability to 
prevent danger is based on our ability to predict it. This ability is limited due to lack 
of knowledge or lack of imagination of what may happen. And third, even if all 
dangers were known, and the theoretical knowledge to eliminate them existed, the 
resources of the society are limited. A fourth limitation is that that the individuals 
making up the society do not have a common understanding of which risks exist and 
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which of them the “government” should protect them from. There is seems also to be 
a problem that for every new technology we introduce, even if it is an technology to 
combat “old” risk, new risk always follows as an uninvited guest. 
 But just as surely as that all risk cannot be eliminated we can eliminate some 
risk. Therefore, given the premises listed above, the government should try to increase 
its knowledge and understanding of risk, and develop new technology and methods 
for predicting it. We, or society as in "the government", may then be able to use the 
available resources where they give most “value for money”. 
 The purpose of the report from the “vulnerability commission” was to establish 
a fundament for decision makers to answer this “value for money” question and the 
report may be seen as a very large risk assessment analysis where the central mandate 
was to “.. give a complete description of the risk of extraordinary strain on the society 
in peace, during crisis or war”. 
 That was a quote from one of the first sections of the mandate and in the 
Norwegian text we will find the word “påkjenninger” which I here have translated as 
“strain”. The use of this word clearly implies that the society is the subject, and that 
the strain is coming from the outside. The mandate for the commission was to 
examine possible threats to the society. Society becomes in this context the subject. It 
is interesting to note that except from one reference to “the civilian population” there 
is no mentioning of people as individuals in the mandate. It is always “society” that is 
vulnerable or at risk. 
 
4.2.1 Individual Risk or Societal Problem? 
Therefore one can conclude that the report is meant to be a “tool” for the government. 
It is supposed to help the government reduce the risk, but not all risk, and particularly 
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not risk on the individual level. It is risk against the society that counts. But this 
brings us again back to risk as a social construct. All risk may be harmful to 
individuals, and if one aggregate all the tiny individual risk “bits” one will get what in 
Norwegian is frequently referred to as a “samfunnsproblem”, or societal problem. But 
not all risk is considered a societal problem, and it will not be sufficient just to look at 
statistics to fin the most “lethal” or “dangerous” risk on and individual level and 
expect this to automatically be recognized as a main societal problem. A Norwegian 
example of this may be the risk of death from assault versus death resulting from a 
traffic accident. According to the newspapers (the tabloids at least), deadly assault is a 
huge and important problem in Norway that demands the authorities full attention. 
However, the official statistics shows that there are at most only a handful of such 
incidents each year, and some even none. The newspapers, portraying themselves as 
representing “the people”, demands that the authorities do something about this 
particular sort of crime and it thus made into or “constructed” as a societal problem. 
However, when compared to the approximately 350 killed in traffic accidents 
annually, this does not seem such an urgent problem any more. Traffic accidents are 
on the other hand treated as something that happens to individuals and not the 
society.12 The commission have however chosen to ignore both these events. In the 
introduction to the report this decision to ignore such events are justified by defining 
them as events that does not require any “extraordinary measures.”(p.23) 
The commission is of course free to include and exclude risks as they see fit, but one 
may ask why events that kill 350 people annually is excluded, when terrorism which 
so far have killed, as mentioned in chapter two of this thesis, none. 
                                                 
12 This apparent discrepancy between what may be “objectively” labeled as the most serious problem 
and the less serious ones, is not new. Already in 1855 the Norwegian social scientist Eilert Sund 
wrote about how the poor and the working class were taking their disproportionate share of the 
death toll due to accidents without this being regarded as a societal problem. (Aven, Boyesen et.al. 
2004) 
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 The technical definition of risk may be at fault here, if I may use the expression. 
The reason is that it prevents aggregation of several “small” events. 
Roger E. Kasperson (Krimsky & Golding, 1992) criticizes authorities for equalling 
low probability/serious consequence events with high probability/less serious events 
with the assumption that society is indifferent. As I see it, the problem here is that for 
a risk to be significant for society, the commission require it to call for “extraordinary 
measures”. An “ordinary” traffic accident, will in this instance not measure up, and is 
in fact registered as a high probability/no consequence event. 
 Only accidents involving public transport is discussed in detail in chapter seven 
and I do underline that I am now strictly writing about how the commission perceives 
the risk from traffic accidents. There are several organizations and pressure groups in 
Norway, together with politicians, the traffic police and the road transport authorities 
that perceive traffic accidents as a societal problem and struggles to lift this higher on 
the national agenda. But I still find traffic accidents as a good example on how the 
definition of a phenomenon, in this instance risk, may a priori exclude some subjects 
from the discussion. Other examples are also found when reading the national 
accidents statistics. The most common cause of accidental death in Norway (as in 
most countries in the Western society) is in fact accidents at home. And there is really 
no pressure groups calling for safer ladders or hedge trimmers 
 
4.2.2 Experts and Democracy 
The problem facing the vulnerability commission when they started their work can be 
split into two. On the one hand we have all the difficulties related to predicting risk in 
general and this will be discussed further in the next chapter. One the other hand we 
have the problem already mentioned of assessing risk on behalf of the public. In 
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addition to the difficulties already discussed, there is also a question of where experts 
groups like the vulnerability commission belongs in a representative democracy like 
Norway. A study of the report reveals that there is very little direct feedback or 
attempts of direct feedback from the public. This does not imply that the commission 
worked in total isolation. The members, especially the politicians, could be expected 
to have a broad field of contact both with the public and professional organisations. 
Risk assessment and acceptable levels of risk have seldom been election issues in 
Norway. Even if one may say that the environmental “wave” of the seventies and 
early eighties could be said to about risk in some parts. There exist therefore very few, 
if any channels for assessing the public perception of risk. People do of course write 
“letters to the editor” in the newspapers and polling institutes ask questions also about 
risk.13 But the commission made no systematic attempt to ensure that their values and 
their expressed answer to “how safe is safe enough?” was in accordance with the 
public they in the end were working on behalf of. This is in accordance with 
Norwegian tradition and one may argue not in the mandate for the commission. In 
Norway there are a long tradition of appointing expert groups to analyse different 
questions or problems. Selected groups and organisations, but not individuals, will 
then be invited to give their opinion on report.  
 But the result is that the “experts” tell the public that this is what you/we should 
worry about, instead of the public telling the experts this is what we worry about. 
How acceptable this is, is then dependent on how one view “experts” and their (in) 
fallibility. I will try to illuminate this by using the commissions numerous references 
to terrorism both as a direct risk in it self and as an indirect cause of risk. Several of 
                                                 
13 My own employee, the Directorate for civil protection and emergency planning does this twice a 
year and the “large accident involving public transport” is the event most probable to happen, 
according to the people asked. But the respondents have only a fixed number of alternative “crisis” 
to choose from. 
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the members of the commission, such as the director of the police security service or 
the military intelligence, can be said to be “experts” on terrorism. Therefore there 
recommendations on terrorism must be taken seriously. But there is (or may be) a 
problem when terrorism is given pre-eminence among risks to be concerned about. In 
order to make such a ranking, the members in theory must not only be experts in 
every field, but should also have knowledge of all possible risk. But even this, if it 
were possible in real life, would not be enough to make a correct ranking of risk. The 
members of the group must also have knowledge on how the public, which on whose 
behalf they are (at least indirectly) working, would rank the same risks. 
 This may get a bit political and somewhat on the side, but “risk assessment” on 
a societal level is also a political act. The reasoning behind this statement goes like 
this: The Government is supposed to execute the will of the public, therefore the 
government’s experts should also represent the will (or in this case the risk 
perception) of the public. But on the other hand experts are called experts because 
they know more on some issues than laymen or the public and they are also expected 
to do this. However, this will often lead experts to believe that they can make better 
decisions than the public. This will in many instances be true, but not every time 
because a lot of the questions experts are asked to answer may be a composite of 
several issues, where many may not be purely technical but instead are related to 
values and beliefs: The latter being areas where experts are no more “experts” than 
“ordinary” people. Conflicts and controversy do often arise when experts and those 
utilising them don't realize this. A related problem is that experts is often asked or 
tempted into answering questions in fields outside their expertise. 
 The expression “the public” is also an ambiguous one. The word “public” are 
used many times throughout this thesis and in the various reports that are discussed 
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herein. “The Public” according to Webster’s is the “people as a whole”, but may be 
given different meanings in different contexts. Usually it is used as a general 
description of the ordinary citizens or lay people, as opposed to the politicians, 
experts and scientists. But members of the three aforementioned groups may at times 
find themselves among the public. Since the public consists of individuals with 
different political, religious, social and cultural values, one should therefore be 
cautious in treating the public as a consistent and homogenous subject. 
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4.3. The Difficulty of Assessing Risk 
4.3.1 And the Future Holds... - the Problem of Predicting Risk 
The obvious problem when using a risk concept that involves probability is that it 
deals with something that may or may not happen in the future. We may make 
predictions, but there will always be some uncertainty present. Risk assessment may 
in some ways be said to be an attempt to control the future. The commission was an 
expert group, chosen by the government to answer specific questions about the future 
and the purpose of the report is to assist the government in making decisions. The 
government is however free to use or ignore the advice as they choose. Unlike some 
other reports and expert groups that are asked to advise on what the state of some field 
of research or economics is, this commission is asked to answer what may be. 
 This is of course impossible with any degree of precision for anything except 
the simplest systems. And even then, you cannot be certain. Dropping a stone from a 
height would be a typical example. Under normal circumstances you would find that 
the stone fell down to earth and that the speed and timing of the fall could be 
calculated with outmost precision using simple mathematical formulas. But the 
experiment may be interrupted, lets say by a bird flying past that snatches the stone 
and flies away with it. This may be seen as a highly unlikely scenario, but cannot be 
totally ruled out. In the same way we must acknowledge that even if a technical 
facility such as a nuclear power plant is completely safe under normal circumstances, 
we will never have absolute control of what happens next and the circumstances may 
turn “un-normal” any moment. 
 The uncertainty is even greater when trying to predict possible actions like 
terrorism, which has complex cultural and social causes, or random natural disasters 
or breakdown in complex technological systems. 
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 There are two methods that may be used when trying to predict future risk. One 
method is to use empirical data and interpolate them into the future. But this method 
presumes a belief that the future will not be too different from the present. For some 
risks this may hold true, but the appointment of a “Vulnerability commission” may be 
seen as result of the governments belief that the future probably will be different than 
the past and that what “we” or the “society” have done so far, will not be sufficient for 
the future.  
 If the commission has based its approach to risk on historical data, one may 
expect the risk mentioned in the report to mirror events that have already resulted in 
death and/or destruction in Norway. This would also be what one may (preliminary) 
expect from the definition of risk as “a function of the probability of an unwanted 
event and the consequence of the event” set out in the introduction to the report. 
However, many of the “risks” discussed in the report, have their inclusion merited by 
the perceived vulnerability of the subject at risk. This subject is frequently a technical 
object related to what is called “critical infrastructure”. This may then be argued is 
only indirectly an answer to the mandates focus on risk to the society. The 
commission’s focus on vulnerability may be seen as a way to circumvent the 
uncertainty inherit in predictions of the future, by concentrating on describing what is. 
 This mirrors the already mentioned methods of using the “actuarial approach” 
which is looking to the past in order to predict the future, in contrast with “fault three 
analysis” where one is looking at the present in order to imagine the future. But I 
since it is people who are doing this assessment, no method can be totally independent 
of the past. People’s experience will always influence their decisions. 
 In the report “vulnerability” is described as ”the difficulties a system will have in 
sustaining its function(s) when exposed to an unwanted action, and also the 
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difficulties the system will have in returning to normal after the action has 
transpired.” (p.21) 
 This description is somewhat out of line with the dictionary definition of 
vulnerability, ”Vulnerable: something capable or susceptible to being wounded or 
hurt” (Webster’s) and it may also be said, the common usage of the term which I have 
chosen to define in this manner: “If two systems, A and B, are exposed to the same 
action, the one suffering the most damage, may be said to be the most vulnerable 
one.” 
 This last definition implies that vulnerability may be reduced by protection, 
which lessens the amount of “action” that gets through, or by building in redundancy 
so that even if some parts of the system are damaged, the system will still continue to 
operate. The commission quite obviously use the term several times in the report in a 
manner that implies this last definition instead of the definition written in the report. 
 However, vulnerability and risk is strongly connected since the vulnerability of 
an object influences both the “probability” and the “consequence” element in the 
technical risk definition. In some instances, the commission uses “vulnerability” as 
synonymous with “easily disturbed or attacked” which in other words mean that when 
something is becoming more vulnerable, the probability of something happening 
increases which again means that the risk is increasing. The commission’s various 
discussions on terrorism is maybe the foremost example of the use of “vulnerability” 
in this context, since a vulnerable object is more likely of being targeted by terrorist 
than a less vulnerable object. The other meaning of vulnerable in this context says 
something about the redundancy built into an object, which in this case is almost 
always a complex system. The telephone network and the power grid system are 
examples of this last sort of “vulnerable” system. Less redundancy in the system 
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equals greater probability of the system malfunctioning. 
 The commission also uses the expression ”vulnerability” in an attempt to 
describe how society’s increasing dependency on complex technologies increases the 
consequences if these technologies should suddenly malfunction. 
 Much of the writing in the report from the “Vulnerability commission” seems to 
be based on the notion that the society is increasingly more vulnerable. This is also 
stated directly in the introduction of the report (p.14). But as I have shown above, this 
could just as well have been phrased as “the risk is increasing”. However this goes 
straight against what empirical material tells us. Most statistics shows that a 
Norwegian citizen has never had a so small risk of meeting an untimely or violent 
death. Cars, planes and boats have never been so safe. This is of course a statement 
related to “objective” measurements of risk, such as deaths pr kilometre travelled or 
other such statistics. But “vulnerability” is a concept connected to what may happen, 
not to what have happened. 
 
4.3.2 The Problem of Measuring Risk 
The public decision makers attempting to decide on acceptable risk levels on behalf of 
the public are facing several problems. There is first of all the challenge of how to 
measure risk. This challenge consists of (at least) two parts that are interlinked. If we 
return to the “technical” concept of risk, we will see that it is made up of the 
components “probability” x “consequence” = “RISK”. The first problem we stumble 
over is to find some quantitative way of “measuring” these three components. For the 
first two there will sometimes exist historical data that make it possible to give quite 
accurate predictions of the consequences of an event and also the probability of an 
event. When new technology, or phenomena with a low frequency is involved, the 
 49
empirical data may be too poor (or there may be no data) that predictions can be made 
with any degree of precision. But this is not only a problem of technical or 
mathematical accuracy. Even if we succeed in establishing a mathematical expression 
of the risk present, this does still not tell us if the risk is “low”, “high” or “too high”. 
There is in another words, a problem of “grading” the components in the risk 
equation. The measurements and predictions must in order to be useful for the public, 
politicians and other users, be translated into a “common” language. Stating that there 
is a 0.01 percent probability that something may happen does really not tell that much. 
It may be rewritten into “one of thousand such events will end in accident”. This may 
make it easier to understand the probability involved. (Slovic, 2000) But it does still 
not answer the question whether this risk is acceptable or not. This is of course 
because deciding if a risk is acceptable or not is not a question about measurement, 
but instead is a question about values. 
 The same problem reoccurs when trying to establish the consequences of an 
event. There may exist quite good estimates over expected casualties, but this is again 
of no help when the difficult challenge is to establish whether these are acceptable 
consequences or not. The question of “acceptable” risk is a therefore matter of values 
and risk perception. 
 This does also seem to be a common opinion among cultural theorists. As Harry 
Otway have put it: “Acceptability is finally decided by political negotiations among 
stakeholders, informed by expert advice” (Krimsky & Goldung,1992, p.222).  
 The commission do mention these problems in sentences like these: “..the level 
of acceptable risk varies between politicians, experts and the public” (p.21). “..the 
question is what should constitute acceptable risk?.. “. it is difficult to establish a 
mathematical definition of this level..”p.23). The commission does not however try to 
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find a definite solution to these problems. This may be acceptable since the 
commission was supposed to give advice, and could therefore leave it to the 
politicians (the Government) to choose the actual level or levels of acceptable risk. 
 According to Steve Rayner, cultural analysis of risk looks behind the perception 
of physical risk, and focuses instead on social norms or policies that are being 
attacked or defended (Krimsky & Golding,1992,p.91). A cultural theorist will thus 
say that people will choose to worry most about those risk that help reinforce the 
social solidarity of their institutions. At first glance, this view may then stand in 
contrast to the commissions attempt at trying to establish what they perceived as an 
“objective” ranking of the risks the threatening society. The commission 
acknowledges the difficulties of establishing a threshold of “acceptable risk”, and tries 
to solve this by focusing on “qualitative” assessments. The commission writes (p.23) 
that it will concern it selves with the risks that poses a threat to fundamental functions 
of society. The commission then goes on to list what it has chosen as these 
fundamental functions. However, what applies to “people” according to Rayner, may 
not automatically apply to a commission. In the first instance the reference to 
“people” in general, is to be understood as the public or lay people. In the second 
instance, we have an appointed commission that belongs in the group “experts”. We 
may of course expect them to choose to concentrate on risks already established in 
their organisational culture. But this may only be elaborate way of saying that the will 
continue to believe in what they already do believe in. 
 It is difficult to decide which risks are the most important or dangerous ones, 
without an understanding of what level of risk is acceptable to the public. One main 
difference in risk perspectives is between assessing risk concerning you and assessing 
risk on behalf of others, as governmental and public organizations must do. The 
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commission is of course appointed to do just that, but spend few words in the report 
discussing any problems that may occur when assessing risk on the behalf of others. 
Especially when the “others” are the whole public, which are bound to have widely 
diverging perceptions of risk. This is the same problem facing all agencies making 
decisions affecting many people and it will almost always be difficult to find effective 
solutions that please everybody. Let say the Government decides to raise taxes to pay 
for health care. This favours the receivers of healthcare over healthy taxpayers. But on 
the other hand, the some taxpayers might view the tax as insurance for the time they 
will need healthcare themselves, and therefore accept it. Invoking peoples risk 
perception further complicates thus what may have been an already difficult question 
about tax, and how they perceive their future.  
 How different public agencies relate to risk may is also down to cultural 
phenomenon due to the differences between, for an example, the US, and Norwegian 
or Scandinavian societies. In Norway the state is expected, and expects, to a large 
extent to take the responsibility for the welfare of its subjects. Almost all services 
concerned with health and social care, safety and security are public ones. This in 
contrast to the US where private corporations or idealistic organizations, the latter 
ones often with a religious connection, takes care of these responsibilities. There has 
however been a trend in Norway since the early 1990s to let private enterprises 
compete with public services. Like running day-care centres for the elder, waste 
disposal, and schooling. This is however staunchly opposed by a majority of the 
political left. 
  It may also be questioned if the public really wishes for a Utopian “risk 
free” society. The numerous people participating in motor sports, skydiving, rock 
climbing or similar activities should be enough to discard this last notion. But some 
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people and organizations believe such utopias can be useful as motivation.14
 In this context it may also be appropriate to discuss if the risk analysis in the 
report should best be viewed as heuristic tools to assist decision making or should be 
viewed as attempts to give an objective description of reality. 
The commission writes about the need to “reduce risk” and decrease “vulnerability”, 
but these are only substitutes. The final goal is of course a reduction of human 
suffering, environmental damage and property destruction. In this context it may not 
necessarily matter it the risk assessment are merely heuristic and not an objective 
description, if the decision makers can use the report in order to make the right 
decisions. 
 
4.3.3 The Problem of Unequal Distribution of Risk 
As mentioned in the introduction, there has been a growing concern among many 
people, not only writers of cultural theory, that the distribution of risk is unfair. And it 
is increasingly unfair. This is especially related to technological risk, where those 
reaping the profits of new technology are not those that bear the risk of this new 
technology. The risk may either be a “by-product” of the production process, or it 
may be a product of the use of this technology. Neighbours to chemical factories or 
nuclear power plants are typical brought forth as examples of the first type. Even if 
these people also benefit from new chemical products and a stable energy supply, 
their proximity to the production facilities cause them to bear an inappropriate high 
share of the risk compared with the benefit they receive. 
 An example of the other type of risk may be the risk of fraud and theft, both of 
money or your identity that one risk when using computers and electronic banking. 
                                                 
14Such as the “0-vision” which states that there should be not deaths from traffic accidents by some 
specified year, and which is adopted by several Nordic governments. 
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Here the risk is a direct consequence of the new technology. In this instance it may be 
argued that the burden of risk is proportional to the benefit received. But there may 
also be argued that software manufactures and financial institutions downplay the risk 
in order to attract more customers. In this last instance, the public are not expert and 
thus may have small chance of understanding the risk involved in using the 
technology. This may also be said about products like cellular phones. Cellular 
phones have been controversial and there are a vociferous minority of researchers that 
claim that the electromagnetic radiation from cell phones may cause cancer. This has 
been disputed by the cell phone companies and also by health authorities in most 
countries. This is again an example of how new technology is so advanced that the 
public have little possibility of deciding for themselves what kind of risk is involved. 
 “Fairness” is a central theme when discussing distribution of risk and Steve 
Rayner (Krimsky & Golding,1992,p.94) introduces a “fairness” equation into the 
“technical” concept of risk to explain why some risks are more accepted by the public 
than other risks. The factors the Rayner find to be important are the trustworthiness of 
regulating and management institutions, principles for apportion liabilities in case of 
unwanted consequences, and procedures for obtaining consent must be acceptable for 
those affected. 
 But with the introduction of this “fairness” equation one may say that we are 
back to risk perception because we are now talking about how risk is either accepted 
or not, which again is another way of phrasing “how risk is perceived”. This brings us 
round again to the fact that setting an acceptable level of risk is all about values. But 
Rayner does here make an attempt to circumvent this problem by describing how 
attributes of the risk managers can be used to decide what constitutes acceptable risk, 
when one is unable to decide on a “value” for how safe is safe enough. 
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 Several of the risk discussed by the commission may be said to be of the type 
where those exposed to the risk receive little or no benefit from the agent causing the 
risk. In some instances, like terrorism those exposed may be totally incapable of 
influencing the cause of the risk in any way. Even if the terrorism is politically 
motivated, and is directed against “the government” in some broad sense and 
therefore people are “responsible” because they voted for it, the modus operandi of 
terrorism is exactly to strike against the “innocent” in order to cause terror and fear. 
 But it is especially risk from new technology that seems to be the main focus of 
those concerned with the unequal distribution of risk, although many of those “new” 
technologies have been around in one form or another since the beginning of the 
industrial revolution. The book “The Silent Spring” by Rachel Carson is often cited as 
one of the most influential books that studied the impact industrialization had on the 
environment and our society. In “Risk Society”, Ulrich Beck specifically focuses on 
how risk is changing our society and how risk, as wealth, is being unequally divided 
between the “haves” and the “have nots”, but with the difference that risk and wealth 
are accumulating at the opposite positions on the social ladder. “This “law” of the 
class-specific distribution of risk and thus the intensification of class antagonisms 
through the concentration of risks among the poor and the weak was valid for a long 
time and still applies today to some central dimensions of risk.”(Beck, p.35) 
 The commission are not overly concerned with the distribution of risk and does 
in fact not recognise that risk is something that can be distributed. Should the 
commission have recognised this? This may be a cause for discussion, but then it may 
only be down to semantics. Just at the concept of “risk management”. Can risk at all 
be managed? Risk is a product of some state of the nature, whether natural or artificial 
created. In itself, one may claim that it cannot be “managed”. What one may manage 
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in many cases however, is the source of the risk and the term “risk coping” may be 
better used, rather than “risk management” when describing peoples reaction to risk. 
We do here return to concept of “objective” and “subjective” risk discussed in section 
4.1.2. But in order for risk to be distributed fairly or unfairly, it must in some sense 
exist in itself as something to distribute. 
 The commission may be criticized for not at least recognizing the problem of 
“fair risk”, but on the other hand, this is an excellent example of how risk assessment 
really is about moral and politics when you look beyond the “technical” concept of 
risk. The commission was also not required by the mandate to discuss this approach to 
risk and since I only relate to the report I can not say if it was discussed internally in 
the commission. But it is clear that a commission that were given the task to look into 
risk in general, could have asked questions like: Is it fair that some people have to risk 
their life in the North Sea so that the State of Norway may earn billions of dollars 
each year? The answer to this depends on how one values an individuals rights and 
“happiness” in relation to the well being of Society as a whole. The utilitarianism of 
John Stuart Mill, with “maximizing general happiness” as it central tenant was maybe 
at one end of the spectrum, but the Scandinavian social democracies have also a long 
tradition of putting society before the individual. I will only follow this so far as 
noting how different views on questions like this may influence how one should, or 
could measure risk. If one answer yes to the question above, one may argue that the 
commission’s conclusion that the risk exposure for the oil workers have increased 
slightly, is wrong. The commission have based this on accident statistics that shows 
that the number of accidents per working hour has gone slightly up the last ten years. 
On the other, since the oil would be extracted any way, the risk should be measured as 
accidents per million barrel produced. Since the oil production has increased, the 
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result is that the risk has gone down. Presto! We have suddenly two contradicting 
statements on risk, that superficially seems to be caused by different measuring 
methods, but which instead really is caused by different moral and political points of 
view. This example is inspired by a similar argument found in “Improving Risk 
Communication” by the American Committee on Risk Perception and 
Communication, which in that instance related to coal production. 
 Steve Rayner (Krimsky & Golding,1992,p.96) writes about how the public does 
not accept a risk that threatens an individual’s health since this risk cannot be spread 
equitably. Most of Rayners examples are taken from the United States and are related 
to risk imposed by private companies. This risk is then a by-product of the production 
of some goods that makes profit for the owners of the company. The risk may thus be 
perceived as “unnecessary” by those who do not share the profits, like neighbours and 
such. These examples of risk may not be directly comparable with the many of the 
risks described in the report. There exists a type of risk where the public does 
recognise or perceive that the “government” have no influence on the cause of the 
risk, and in such circumstances, there will be few accusations of “unfair” distribution 
of risk. However, in many instances related to private companies, the government will 
have the role as a regulator and controller of pollution and where a factory is to be 
located. Then the government may just as likely to be criticized along the same lines, 
as the private actors described by Rayner. The government may also be perceived to 
have a moral responsibility to minimize the risk for all citizens. 
 There is a relationship between the commissions use of the concept “society” 
and where the commission suggests risk originate. On one side the commission 
describes the risk as originating outside and the (technical) system is not in it self the 
source of the risk, which is in stark contrast too for example Winner, as referred to in 
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the introduction, who sees the technological change itself as a cause of risk, or Beck 
who voices much of the same concern. On the other hand, when discussing 
vulnerability, it is exactly the technological development that the commission 
identifies as causing new types of risk (or vulnerability). Examples of this other side 
of their argumentation are the societies increased reliance on electrical energy and 
telecommunications. The commission however mostly accepts this as a fait accompli, 
and does not discuss if this development should, or could be reversed or guided in a 
more risk free direction. This may however be outside its mandate. 
  
4.3.4 Solving Controversy 
There are few instances where the commission explicit recognizes that different 
methods for assessing risk may yield contra dictionary advice. One of the few is 
found in chapter 7 on Transport Safety. 
 In that chapter the commission also introduces, in a discussion regarding tunnel 
safety, the possibility that the public perception of risk is a part of the problem, and 
that “ society lacks a trustworthy apparatus for handling these 
situations/debates..”(p.76). 
 Norway is a mountainous country and has thus and abundance of road tunnels. 
Although there have been no major accidents in Norwegian tunnels the last years, the 
debate on tunnel safety resurfaces frequently in the media, often due to accidents 
abroad or “near-accidents” in Norwegian tunnels. It is one of the few instances in the 
report where perception of risk is discussed in any detail. In this chapter the report 
also mentions the ongoing debate between the transport authorities that argues that 
tunnels are “safe”, based on the probability of accidents, and cost-value analysis’s that 
show that money would be better spent on improving road safety other places than in 
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tunnels, and the former Directorate for Fire and Electrical Safety (DBE), now DSB, 
which is concerned because of the serious consequences of even a small fire inside 
one of the longer road tunnels. Even though the probability of this happening is quite 
small, this is still an ongoing debate in Norway. I believe the most important reason 
that this issue has developed into a controversy is that it is a question about priorities. 
Which is another way to say that it is a question about money or what should be done 
first. There are two main causes for the “risk” in the tunnel case. The first problem 
and the easiest to solve, is that many tunnels have been waterproofed using a highly 
flammable material. This can be replaced fairly cheaply compared to the other 
“problem” which is that with a few exceptions, most road tunnels in rural Norway are 
just that, one tunnel. In the case of a fire inside one of these types of tunnels, it would 
quickly fill with smoke and tests and experience from tunnel fires abroad indicates 
that most people trapped in the tunnel would quickly suffocate from the poisonous 
fumes. Building all longer tunnels as two separate tunnels or with separate escape 
tunnels, would almost double the cost of each tunnel project. This would lead to fewer 
tunnels being built which at the present would not earn a politician any votes back 
home. 
 This controversy may thus be seen as a triangle between the DSB who wants 
“safer” tunnels, the Transport Authorities that would spend the money otherwise to 
give what they perceive as better “value” or safety for money and the politicians that 
supposedly listens to the public and therefore on the whole wants more tunnels. The 
public is however not “present” in chapter seven and the commission does not 
perceive this controversy as a problem of values, but more as a problem of “facts”, or 
more precisely as a problem caused by different risk assessment with different 
conclusions. In my opinion the commission fails to recognize that this is not a 
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“technical problem” but a problem of how to answer the question “how safe is safe 
enough”.15
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 This debate is still going on in Norway. A quick search in newspaper finds several cases of new 
tunnel projects being planned where there is considerable public debate around how and where to 
build new tunnels. The most recent one from the southwestern part of Norway where proponents 
and opponents of the “RYFAST” projects argues around the same division lines as described by the 
commission. See for an example: http://aftenbladet.no/nyheter/article.jhtml?articleID=213506 
 60
5. Conclusion 
This report was the work of a commission. The commission did also rely heavily on 
the work of several sub committees and external experts. This obviously has 
influenced how the commission worked and wrote their report. In the end I have tried 
to ignore this aspect and treated the commission as “it” and discussed what “it” wrote 
in the report. 
 My conclusion after reading the report is that in the end, risk assessment boils 
down to morals and ethics. It is impossible to do a risk analysis without a explicit or 
implicit stand on the question “how safe is safe enough?”. This is an ethical question. 
And for the Government, a political question as well. The answer to how safe is safe 
enough? varies from individual to individual and from group to group. As I have 
shown, one of the problems facing government is that it have to choose risk levels on 
behalf of the whole public and therefore must use some kind of “average” risk 
perception as a reference, with all the accompanying problems related to the unequal 
distribution of risk. 
 It seems to be a fact that when attempting to do a risk assessment on behalf of 
society, you do end up with a political document. Even if the commission extensively 
have relied on statistical data and empirical experience, the report is also a through 
and through product of opinions of the commissions members. The opinions are most 
of the times very well funded, but they are still opinions, values, judgements or 
assessments based on what the members believe poses the most serious risk to 
society. It is therefore not correct to call this is a scientific report as such, even if 
some parts such as those concerning health and epidemics are based on scientific 
studies and recommendations. 
 In chapter ten the commission recognize the “fact” that there are too few 
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hospitals posts suited for treatment of patients with highly contagiously diseases. This 
is a typical example on how what is really an assessment “there are too few” is 
presented as the fact: there are too few, without the commission recognizing, at least 
in the report, that this is really an opinion based on the value the medical profession 
gives to the probability of an epidemic hitting Norway. As far as I know, there are 
probably too few, and my point was not to argue against the commission’s 
assessment, but to show how easily it is to confuse “fact” with “assessment”. 
 This is probably inevitable when trying to assess risk for very complex systems 
and there is probably no more complex system than human society. There are simply 
to many variables and unknown factors for it to be possible to predict how the system 
will behave and what will happen next. The approach that risk equals “probability x 
consequence” is too narrow to discover all the risk such a system faces. The 
“technical” concept and the “engineering” approach such as the fault three method, 
may suffice when dealing with separate parts of the system that have low complexity. 
But these part assessments cannot just simply be assembled into overreaching 
assessment for the society that is made up of all the separate parts. Then you enter 
into the world of values and what the members of the commission believe is or should 
be the most important risk(s).  
 That I have come to the conclusion that other concepts of risk could have 
supplemented the “technical” concept, and that this could have improved on some 
aspects of the commission’s report, does not undermine the usefulness of the report. I 
believe, and I also suspect most members of the Norwegian society would agree, that 
the commission have identified most of the major risks threatening Norwegian 
society. A harsh word like “useless” could only be justified if the commission really 
was expected to identify all risk. The mandate do in fact require the commission to 
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give a “complete description of the risk of extraordinary strain on the society”, but I 
believe that I have shown that this is not a realistic expectation for any risk 
assessment. 
 The commission where also a part of a political process and it can therefore not 
be judged only on the contents of it report. There is a distinction between the 
commission’s mandate, which states what the commission should do, and the 
government’s motivation for establishing the commission in the first place. I have not 
explored the latter in great detail, but the subsequent treatment of the report and the 
frequent references to it bear witness to how it has contributed to raising the risk 
awareness of society. Which also were among the reasons the commission was 
appointed.  
 Risk assessment is always about values and concepts like “technical” risk 
analysis are far from neutral, even if its name may suggest so. Each assessment 
method has its pros and cons, which are related to how risk is measured. Choosing 
one method instead of another may give different answers and a different “measure” 
of the risk present. The choice of a particular method or concept will therefore also 
greatly influence the measures that are proposed in order to eliminate, reduce or 
redistribute risk. Thus in the end the choosing of methods for risk assessment is thus 
an instance a political act, even if those choosing does always not recognize it as such. 
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Appendix 
 
i. Norwegian abbreviations 
 
Organizations: 
• DSB - (until 1.sept 2003) Direktoratet for sivilt beredskap. The Directorate for 
civil defence and emergency planning 
• DSB - (after 1.sept 2003) Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap. The 
Directorate for civil protection and emergency planning 
• DBE - Direktoratet for brann- og elsikkerhet. The Directorate for fireprotection  
• NSM - Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet. The National Security Authority 
 
Public documents: 
• NOU - Norges offentlige utredninger: A report by a commission or expert group 
appointed by the government. Is usually followed by a “Stortingsmelding” 
• St.Prp - Stortings proposisjon: A governmental proposal to the Parliament  
• Ot.Prp - Odelstingsproposisjon: A government proposal to the Parliament 
regarding new law. 
• St.Mld - Stortingsmelding: An orientation to the Parliament. Usually contains 
descriptions of forthcoming changes to the public sector. As today, with a 
government without majority support in the parliament, the St.mld may be 
perceived as a proposal that the Parliament may change or turn down. 
• Innst.S - Innstilling til Stortinget: A recommendation made by a parliament 
committee to the Parliament on how a Governmental proposal should be voted 
on. 
 
 
